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This paper provides an empirical investigation of the hypothesis that companies engage in corporate
social responsibility (CSR) in order to offset corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). We find general
support for the causal relationship: when companies do more “harm,” they also do more “good.” The
empirical analysis is based on an extensive 15-year panel dataset that covers nearly 3,000 publicly
traded companies. In addition to the overall finding that more CSI results in more CSR, we find evidence
of heterogeneity among industries, where the effect is stronger in industries where CSI tends to be
the subject of greater public scrutiny. We also investigate the degree of substitutability between different
categories of CSR and CSI. Within the categories of community relations, environment, and human
rights—arguably among those dimensions of social responsibility that are most salient—there is a
strong within-category relationship. In contrast, the within-category relationship for corporate governance
is weak, but CSI related to corporate governance appears to increase CSR in most other categories.
Thus, when CSI concerns arise about corporate governance, companies seemingly choose to offset
with CSR in other dimensions, rather than reform governance itself.
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School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
Yale University
195 Prospect Street











There exists a large growing literature that investigates the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and financial performance. Attempting to explain why companies engage in 
various forms of CSR, most of the research tests for evidence in support of the notion that 
companies do “well” by doing “good.” The majority of studies find a positive correlation 
between CSR and different indicators of financial performance, yet many studies find no 
correlation, or even negative correlation.
1 Even for reasons beyond these seemingly 
contradictory results, questions remain about why companies engage in CSR and whether studies 
of this type can provide reasonable answers. It is well known that correlation does not mean 
causation, and critics of the literature point to problems of endogeneity: Does CSR improve 
financial performance, or does better financial performance free up resources for companies to 
engage in CSR? Another challenge facing research in this area relates to the question of how to 
define CSR, let alone measure it for purposes of empirical analysis. 
This paper takes a different approach. We seek to explain why companies engage in CSR, 
but we do not focus directly on the link to financial performance. Instead, we investigate the 
proposition that companies engage in CSR in order to offset corporate social irresponsibility 
(CSI). While the link to financial performance is implicit, our analysis seeks to evaluate a 
different causal mechanism underlying CSR: that CSI is a liability and companies do “good” in 
order to offset “bad.” 
While there are many definitions of CSR in the literature, we build our conceptual 
framework on the definition put forth in Heal (2005): Corporate social responsibility is a 
                                                 
1 See Heal (2008) and Vogel (2005) for general overviews, and for particular studies, see Waddock and Graves 
(1997), Berman et al. (1999), Hillman and Keim (2001), and Barnett and Salomon (2006). Systematic reviews of the 




program of actions to reduce externalized costs or to avoid distributional conflicts. This 
definition is appealing because it has a foundation in economic theory. As Heal describes, CSR 
can be interpreted as a Coasian solution to problems associated with social costs. There is much 
empirical support for the notion that companies are penalized if they are perceived to conduct 
business in ways that conflict with social values. This is particularly true when inconsistencies 
arise between the pursuit of corporate profits and social goals—such as environmental 
protection, public health, and human rights, among others. In cases where the inconsistencies are 
large and there is sufficient public awareness, it is advantageous for companies to anticipate the 
social pressure and to take a proactive stance toward lessoning the potential for conflict. Actions 
of this type are considered CSR, and they often comprise an important part of corporate strategy. 
More formal treatments of the same motives for CSR are developed as part of “private politics” 
in the work of Baron (2001, 2003) and Baron and Diermeier (2007).   
This interpretation of CSR implies that companies have an incentive to act more socially 
responsible in order to offset actions that are perceived as socially irresponsible. In parallel, we 
thus introduce the following definition: Corporate social irresponsibility is a set of actions that 
increases externalized costs and/or promotes distributional conflicts. It is easy to envision how 
some industries are perceived as being associated with greater CSI, with examples including 
tobacco companies and “big oil.” But even within industries, particular companies may have 
reputations for greater CSI because they tend to employ business practices that are more in 
conflict with social values, or perhaps because of unforeseen events such as an oil spill. Despite 
the potential costs, companies are often willing to make themselves susceptible to perceptions of 
CSI in order to take advantage of profitable opportunities or to avoid higher costs. Recent 
evidence suggests, for example, that so-called “sin” stocks—those involving alcohol, tobacco,  
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and gaming—earn higher expected returns than other comparable stocks (Hong and Kacperczyk 
2007). Companies seeking to minimize costs are also known to locate operations in places with 
less stringent labor standards, environmental regulations, or both. 
One way for companies to manage the risk of CSI is, of course, to engage in fewer acts of 
social irresponsibility. But another possibility—the one we investigate here—is for companies to 
use CSR as a means to offset CSI. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that CSR is an increasing 
function of CSI. We take advantage of panel data on nearly 3,000 publicly traded companies in 
the United States. Our key variables on CSR and CSI are based on the Kinder, Lydenberg, 
Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) Social Ratings Database between 1991 and 2005.
2 These 
data consist of more than 80 different indicators and are the most frequently cited source of 
corporate social performance in the academic literature. We construct measures of overall CSR 
and CSI, along with separate measures for specific issue areas: community, corporate 
governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, product quality and 
safety, and controversial business issues. In order to control for other factors that may affect 
CSR, we also collected annual accounting data from the Compustat North America database. 
We find general support for the hypothesis that more CSI results in more CSR. In other 
words, when companies do more harm, they also do more good. The result holds regardless of 
whether we identify the relationship off of variation within companies or between companies. 
We also find heterogeneity among industries, where the effect of CSI on CSR appears to be 
stronger in industries for which CSI tends to be the subject of greater public scrutiny, with 
examples being chemical and pharmaceutical companies and the automobile industry. Finally, we 
investigate the degree of substitutability between different categories of CSR and CSI. While 
                                                 
2 The KLD Social Ratings Database has been acquired and modified several times and recent years. The period over 
which we conduct our study is one for which relatively few changes occurred to the rating system. The period that 
we study also takes place prior to the economic recession that began to take hold in 2007.  
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CSI in the specific area of corporate governance does not affect CSR in the same category, it 
does stimulate CSR in most other categories. This result suggests that when companies are 
perceived as having poor corporate governance from a CSI perspective, they seek to compensate 
in other areas of social performance. In contrast, we find a strong relationship between CSI and 
CSR within the specific areas of community relations, environment, and human rights, perhaps 
because these dimensions of corporate social impacts—good and bad—are among the most 
salient to the public. 
Our paper builds on a growing body of literature that emphasizes the strategic nature of 
corporate social responsibility in the corporate decision-making process. Porter and Kramer 
(2006) argue that by overcoming the dichotomist thinking about business and society, companies 
can integrate social considerations more effectively into core business operations and strategy. 
What we are finding in this paper—namely, the phenomenon that companies are using CSR in 
order to mitigate harm from value chain activities—is a part of such an integration. Muller and 
Kräussl (2011) find a similar result as it relates specifically to corporate philanthropy to offset a 
bad reputation. Using Hurricane Katrina as an exogenous shock, they find that companies with 
poor social reputations experienced worse abnormal stock returns, but were also more likely to 
make charitable donations in response to the disaster. In a recent working paper, Minor (2011) 
builds on the idea of CSR as insurance against negative business shocks and finds empirical 
evidence in support of the idea. While the latter finding is related, note that the direction of 
causality is different from what we study in the present paper. As will become clear, and more in 
line with Muller and Kräussl (2011), we are interested in how CSR occurs in response to 
negative shocks to CSI.  
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Finally, the present paper contributes to a recent methodological trend in the literature on 
CSR in general and the use of the KLD data in particular. Mattingly and Berman (2006) show 
that the strength and concern items in the KLD Social Ratings data are divergent constructs, and 
therefore should not be combined to form a single index, as is customary in most of the existing 
empirical research. We overcome this methodological issue by treating the strength and concern 
items separately and using them to form independent measures of CSR and CSI, respectively. We 
are aware of one other study that uses a similar approach of separating strength and concern 
items in the KLD data. Strike, Gao, and Bansal (2006) show that international diversification of 
S&P 500 companies is positively correlated with both CSR and CSI. They do not, however, 
consider the strategic relationship between CSR and CSI, and this is the primary focus of what 
follows here.  
 
2. Data 
The KLD Social Ratings Database is the most widely used measure of corporate social 
performance among investment managers and academic researchers. Investment managers have 
historically referred to KLD’s ratings when making decisions that require screening into 
investment funds that take account of various dimensions of social responsibility. The KLD 
ratings data are also the most frequently cited source of corporate social performance within the 
academic literature. Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2009) provide a critical evaluation of the KLD 
data as a measure of social performance. They compare the KLD data related to environmental 
performance with Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) records and compliance with environmental 
regulations. With respect to environmental performance alone, they find that the concern ratings 
are good summaries of past performance, while the strength items are not predictive. They also  
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make suggestions for more optimally using publically available data in such rating schemes. 
Notwithstanding their findings, there is no other ratings data available with such broad coverage 
of companies and topic areas over many years. These are the reasons why KLD ratings have 
served as the industry standard and why they are well suited for our investigation of the 
relationship between CSR and CSI.    
  The KLD data cover approximately 80 indicators in seven major issue areas: community, 
corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product 
quality and safety. Each issue area has a number of strength and concern items, where a binary 
measure indicates the presence or absence of that particular strength or concern. For example, the 
community category contains seven strength items (charitable giving, innovative giving, non-U.S 
charitable giving, support for housing, support for education, volunteer programs, and other 
strengths) and four concern items (investment controversies, negative economic impact, tax 
disputes, and other concerns). In addition to the seven major issue areas, the KLD data provide 
information about involvement in “controversial business issues,” which include involvement 
with alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and tobacco. Involvement in any of 
these sectors results in a negative indicator. In Table 1, we list all of the KLD indicator variables 
and categorize them in their corresponding issue areas. 
The KLD data is based on annual evaluations of companies in the database on each item 
through various sources, including public records and media reports, monitoring of corporate 
advertising, surveys, and on-site evaluations. The KLD data begins in 1991, and we use the 
complete dataset between 1991 and 2005. The number of companies included in the dataset is 
not constant over the entire study period. Table 2 provides a summary of the index companies 
included each year and the approximate number. Between 1991 and 2000, the dataset included  
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roughly 650 companies, all of which were listed in either the S&P 500 or the Domini 400 Social 
Index. The number increased to 1,100 companies in 2001-2002, with the inclusion of companies 
in the Russell 100 Index and the Large Cap Social Index. Then in 2003, the Russell 2000 Index 
and the Broad Market Social Index were added, bringing the total number of companies to 
approximately 3,100. 
  As mentioned previously, we use the KLD data to generate variables for CSR and CSI. 
We consider all the strength items to be consistent with CSR and all the concern items to be 
consistent with CSI. To construct variables for overall CSR and CSI, we separately sum all the 0-
1 strength and 0-1 concern items, respectively.
3 Note that this procedure places equal weight on 
each item. One complication with this procedure is that we want the variables to be comparable 
between years, and as indicated in Table 1, some items have been added or removed between 
years. To account for this annual variation, we standardize the variables within each year.  
  We then followed the same procedure to create CSR and CSI variables for different 
dimensions, corresponding to the different issue areas in the KLD data. This entailed separately 
summing the strength and concern items within each category. These variables were also 
standardized within each year to account for items being added, removed, or moved to a different 
category. While both CSR and CSI variables were created for each of the seven KLD issue 
categories, only a CSI variable was created for controversial business issues, as there are only 
concern indicators for this category. 
  We also collected annual financial and accounting data for all of the companies listed in 
the KLD Social Ratings database from 1991 through 2005 from the Compustat North America 
database. In the empirical analysis, we use five variables to control for observable company 
                                                 
3 Note that this approach differs from the standard use of the KLD data in the literature, which simply sums all the 
strength items and subtracts all the concern items, yielding an overall measure of corporate social performance. The 
standard approach is, however, the source of Mattingly and Berman’s (2006) critique referenced previously.   
 
8
characteristics: ROA is return on assets (earnings divided by total assets) and captures financial 
performance; Debt is the company’s debt ratio (total debt divided by total assets) and captures 
interest cost and leverage risk; Assets is total assets, Sales is net sales, Employ is number of 
employees. The latter three variables are used to control for company size and operating costs. 
  The final set of variables are industry categories for all of the companies included in the 
KLD data. We categorize companies based on SIC codes and aggregate them according to the 
categories in Waddack and Graves (1997), with one exception. Rather than create one category 
for Computer, Auto and Aerospace, we break them into two categories: Computers & Precision 
Products and Auto & Aerospace. The list of different industry categories, the inclusive range of 
SIC codes, and the corresponding number of companies used in our empirical analysis can be 
found in Table 4, which we discuss further in the next section. We employ this breakdown of 
industries in order to make inter-industry comparisons without having to parse the data into too 
many categories. Moreover, because these categories have been used repeatedly in the literature 
on corporate social performance, it facilitates comparison to use the same categorization here.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
We first test the general hypothesis that overall CSR is increasing in overall CSI, that is, whether 
companies do “good” in order to offset “bad.” To determine whether the data are consistent with 
this relationship, we specify the following regression model:  
(1)  CSRit = CSIi,t-1 + ROAi,t-1 + Debtit +lnAssetit + θlnSalesit  
+ lnEmployit + t + i + εit   
where  i indexes companies and t indexes years. In this specification, the right-hand-side 
variables CSI and ROA are lagged one year to address potential concerns about endogeneity,  
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whereby CSR in a given year could affect CSI and ROA in the same year. The maintained 
assumption is that CSR in any given year does not affect CSI or ROA of the previous year. At the 
end of this section, however, we consider alternative assumptions and specifications and discuss 
robustness of the results. We take the natural log of the company size variables (i.e., Assets, 
Sales, Employ) because of the large variation between companies in the data. The coefficient of 
primary interest is , as it provides and estimate of the relationship between CSR and CSI. A 
positive and statistically significant estimate of  would be consistent with the hypothesis that 
CSR is an increasing function of CSI. 
  Table 3 reports three different estimates of the parameters in specification (1): the pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS), the between, and the fixed-effects (within) models. Though each 
model is based on different assumptions, all three produce an estimate of  that is positive and 
highly statistically significant. The pooled OLS and between estimators are consistent under the 
assumption that i is uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables, but the two models differ 
on the source of identification. For the pooled OLS model, identification comes from variation 
both within companies over time and between companies cross-sectionally; whereas, for the 
between model, identification comes from only cross-sectional variation between companies, as 
the data is time averaged. Nevertheless, the models produce similar results and indicate, due to 
our standardization of the variables, that an increase in CSI of one standard deviation in a given 
year is associated with a .190 or .152 increase in the standard deviation of CSR the following 
year.  
The fixed-effects estimator is perhaps more preferable, however, as it does not rely on the 
assumption that i is uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. Identification for this 
model comes from only variation year-to-year within companies. The advantage of having a  
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fixed effect for each company is that the model accounts for all time-invariant heterogeneity 
among companies. The fixed-effects estimate of  is lower, which suggests that the unobserved 
heterogeneity may be positively correlated with CSI. The magnitude of the estimate implies that 
a one standard deviation increase in CSI in a given year results in a .102 increase in the standard 
deviation of CSR the next year. Based on this model, we also find that CSR is increasing in total 
assets, but decreasing in net sales. Interestingly, in no model do we find a statistically significant 
relationship between the lagged return on assets (i.e., financial performance) and CSR. 
  We now consider the possibility that the relationship between CSR and CSI is 
heterogeneous among industries. We restrict attention to the fixed-effects estimates of 
specification (1), i.e., the preferred model, but now estimate the equation separately for each of 
the 14 industries described previously. Table 4 reports the estimates of  for each industry, along 
with the number of observations and R-squared for each model. The other variables are included 
in each of the models but are not reported in the table. A robust finding across all estimates of  
is that the relationship between CSI and CSR is not negative: all coefficients are either 
statistically indistinguishable from zero or positive and statistically significant. Industries for 
which the relationship is statistically significant are Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals, Heavy 
Manufacturing, Computers & Precision Products, Auto & Aerospace, Telephone & Utilities, 
Wholesale & Retail, Bank & Financial Services, Hotel & Entertainment, and Hospital 
Management. The magnitude of the effect is greater in the industries of Chemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals, Auto & Aerospace, Bank & Financial Services, Hotel & Entertainment, and 
Hospital Management. 
  One possible interpretation of these results is that the effect of CSI on CSR is positive in 
industries subject to greater public scrutiny, as could be the case with Heavy Manufacturing,  
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Auto & Aerospace, Bank & Financial Services, and Hotel & Entertainment. It is, however, 
difficult to definitively state which industries are in fact the ones more or less in the public eye. 
But related research finds that CSR tends to be more prevalent in industries that are advertising-
intensive and therefore consumer-oriented (Fisman, Heal, and Nair 2005), and that are based on 
credence and experience goods (Siegel and Vitaliano 2007). There is also evidence that for 
consumer oriented industries, greater corporate social performance is associated with better 
financial performance, while the opposite is true for more industrial-based industries (Baron, 
Harjoto, and Jo 2009). Similarly, we find that the link between CSR and CSI appears stronger in 
several of the consumer oriented sectors, especially for the automobile industry, financial 
services, and hotel and entertainment.
4 
  We have thus far combined all indicators of CSI into a single measure, but we now 
consider whether overall CSR is more or less responsive to CSI in different dimensions. In 
particular, we disaggregate the different categories of CSI and separately estimate the effect on 
overall CSR. While we continue, for the time being, to aggregate CSR into one left-hand-side 
variable, we do relax that assumption next. Our general, disaggregated CSI specification takes 
the form 
 (2)  CSRit = 1CSIcgovi,t-1 + 2CSIcomi,t-1 + 3CSIdivi,t-1 +4CSIempi,t-1  
+ 5CSIenvi,t-1  + 6CSIhumi,t-1 + 7CSIproi,t-1 + 8CSIcbii,t-1  
+ ROAi,t-1 + Debtit + lnAssetit + θlnSalesit + lnEmployit + t + i + εit . 
The only difference from specification (1) is that CSI is disaggregated into separate measures for 
each issue area in the KLD data. Recall, however, that to make uniform comparisons between 
years, the CSI measure for each issue area is standardized for each year. The value of 
                                                 
4 We do not have a good explanation for why the relationship between CSI and CSR has the greatest magnitude in 
the hospital management industry, but, as we discuss later, this result is not robust to alternative specifications.  
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specification (2) is that we can estimate the partial effect of CSI in each dimension on overall 
CSR. 
  In parallel with the previous aggregated results, Table 5 reports the results of the pooled 
OLS, the between, and the fixed-effects estimators. The results of the pooled OLS and between 
models are again quite similar. With the exception of diversity, all dimension-specific CSI 
coefficients that are statistically different from zero have a positive sign. An increase in CSI with 
respect to the dimensions of corporate governance, community, environment, human rights, and 
product quality and safety all result in more overall CSR. In contrast, more CSI with respect to 
diversity results in less overall CSR, but this result does not hold up in the fixed-effects model, 
where fewer of the coefficients are statistically significant. The results that remain are those for 
corporate governance, community, and environment. One could argue that these dimensions of 
CSI tend to be the most salient in terms of media and public concern, especially over the period 
of our data that spans 1991 through 2005. Hence these results can be interpreted in support of the 
idea that CSR is responsive to CSI in the dimensions where public pressure is most present. Note 
that in terms of magnitudes, CSI with respect to corporate governance has the largest affect on 
overall CSR. The other results in Table 5 relate to the effects of observable company 
characteristics, and these, not surprisingly, are very close to those already discussed in Table 3.  
The final component of our empirical analysis is a further investigation of the 
relationship between CSR and CSI within the different issue areas. Specifically, we examine 
whether CSR in one dimension is more or less responsive to CSI within the same dimension. To 
test for this, we now disaggregate the measure of overall CSR into its different dimensions, 
based on the KLD issue areas. We then estimate variants of specification (2) in which the left-
hand-side variable is an issue-specific measure of CSR. For example, the model for corporate  
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governance has CSR for only corporate governance as the left-hand-side variable. We thus have 
seven different models corresponding to the different issue areas in the KLD data. In all models, 
the right-hand-side variables remain the same as those in specification (2). 
We again focus on the preferred fixed-effects estimates, and Table 6 reports the results for 
all seven models. The highlighted cells contain the coefficients on the dimension of CSI that 
corresponds to the same dimension of CSR in the dependent variable. Within three issue areas, 
the results indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship. More CSI within the 
categories of community, environment, and human rights results in more CSR in the same 
category. The magnitude of the effect is strongest within the environment dimension. While we 
find no statistically significant effect for corporate governance, diversity, and product quality and 
safety, the relationship is negative and statistically significant for the employee category. While 
we have no good explanation for the employee relations result, it may be due to the way the 
employee relations category is constructed in the KLD Social Ratings data. The items in the 
strength and concern groups are mirror images of each other, far more so than any other category 
in the database. This leads to the relationship that whenever a company has a positive employee 
relations score, it is likely to have less of the negative employee relations score, and vice versa. 
But referring back to the issue areas with a positive relationship between CSR and CSI—i.e., 
community relations, environment, and human rights—these again are the categories of 
corporate social performance that one could argue are most salient to the public. 
Another pattern that emerges quite strongly in the results of Table 6 is the inter-dimension 
effect of CSI with respect to corporate governance. While an increase in corporate governance 
CSI does not increase CSR in the same category, it does increase CSR in most other categories. 
The result is positive and statistically significant on CSR with respect to community, diversity,  
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employee, environment, and product quality and safety. One possible explanation for these 
results stems from the fact that decision-making about CSR is a corporate governance issue (see 
Johnson and Greening 1999; Hillman, Keim, and Luce 2001). Hence, when CSI arises about 
corporate governance—such as concerns about high compensation or low political 
accountability—those responsible for corporate governance seemingly choose to offset with CSR 
in other dimensions, rather than reform governance itself. Other categories of CSI that appear to 
cause increases in different CSR categories are community and environment, both of which we 
have argued are among the more salient dimensions of social concern. Community is related to 
human rights, environment is related to corporate governance, and both are related to employee 
relations. 
There are, of course, many ways to estimate regression models in order to evaluate the 
relationship between CSR and CSI. While we have presented the results of models that we 
consider to produce the most reliable estimates, it is worth mentioning some alternative 
specifications that we have tried, but that have little effect on the main findings. Recall that we 
have used lagged values of CSI and ROA throughout in order to avoid potential endogeneity, 
whereby contemporaneous levels of CSR and CSI may be determined jointly and CSR may 
affect financial performance (see, for example, Baron, Harjoto, and Jo 2009). To evaluate the 
effect of using lagged variables, we estimated all models without lags, although we do not report 
the results because they are very similar to those discussed already. With respect to the fixed-
effects estimates there are only three qualitative differences: the estimate of  in Table 4 for 
hospital management becomes statistically insignificant, the coefficient on CSIproit in Table 5 
becomes statistically significant, and the negative coefficient on CSIdivit becomes statistically 
significant in the diversity equation in Table 6. More generally, however, the coefficients have  
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similar magnitudes regardless of whether or not we use lagged variables. This suggests that 
either contemporaneous endogeneity is not an important concern or using lagged variables is not 
an adequate correction. We side with the former explanation. With the lagged specifications, it 
seems less plausible that companies would increase CSI this year in anticipation of increasing 
CSR next year; for if this were the case, they could simply increase CSR immediately with 
perhaps greater effect.  
Another possible critique, which is somewhat related, is that a single year is too short of a 
planning horizon over which to analyze company decisions relating CSI and CSR. We address 
this concern by estimating each of the models with a two-year lagged average of the CSI and 
ROA variables. Because this reduces the amount of observations included in the models even 
further, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients change some, as does the statistical 
significance in some cases. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of results remains the same: CSI has 
a positive effect on CSR. It is also worth noting that a longer planning horizon is consistent with 
the results reported already for the between estimator. Because the estimator is based on time-
averaged data for each company, it can be interpreted as treating all of the years as the same 
planning horizon and identifying the coefficients off of cross-sectional variation between 




This paper provides an empirical investigation of the hypothesis that companies engage in CSR 
in order to offset CSI. The idea is that CSI poses a financial liability that companies seek to 
minimize by compensating with CSR. Such a relationship is implied by the conceptualization of  
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corporate social performance in Heal (2005) and Baron (2001, 2003). We find general support 
for the causal relationship: when companies do more harm, they also do more good. The 
empirical analysis is based on an extensive 15-year panel dataset that covers nearly 3,000 
publicly traded companies. In addition to the overall finding that more CSI results in more CSR, 
we find evidence of heterogeneity among industries, where the effect of CSI on CSR appears to 
be stronger in industries where CSI tends to be the subject of greater public scrutiny. We also 
investigate the degree of substitutability between different categories of CSR and CSI. Within the 
categories of community relations, environment, and human rights—arguably those dimensions 
of social responsibility that are the most salient—there is a strong within-category relationship. 
Within the category of corporate governance, however, the within-category relationship is weak, 
but CSI related to corporate governance appears to increase CSR in most other categories. Thus, 
when CSI arises about corporate governance, companies seemingly choose to offset with CSR in 
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Table 1: List of the strength and concern items in the KLD Social Ratings Database 
 
Category Strength  Items  Concern  Items 
Community  Generous Giving  Investment Controversies 
(com)  Innovative Giving  Negative Economic Impact 
  Support for Housing  Indigenous Peoples Relations ('00-'01) 
  Support for Education (added '94)  Tax Disputes (added '05) 
  Indigenous Peoples Relations (added '00, moved '02)  Other Concern 
  Non-U.S. Charitable Giving   
  Volunteer Programs (added '05)   
 Other  Strength   
Corporate Limited  Compensation High  Compensation 
Governance  Ownership  Tax Disputes (moved '05) 
(cgov) Transparency/Communications  (added  '05)  Ownership 
  Political Accountability (added '05)  Accounting (added '05) 
  Other Strength  Transparency (added '05) 
    Political Accountability (added '05) 
    Other  Concern 
Diversity CEO  Controversies 
(div) Promotion  Non-Representation 
  Board of Directors  Other Concern 
 Work/Life  Benefits   
 Women/Minority  Contracting   
  Employment of the Disabled   
  Gay & Lesbian Policies   
 Other  Strength   
Employee  Union Relations  Union Relations 
Relations  No Layoff Policy (ended '94)  Safety Controversies 
(emp)  Cash Profit Sharing  Workforce Reductions 
  Involvement  Pension/Benefits (added '92) 
  Strong Retirement Benefits  Other Concern 
  Health and Safety Strength (added '03)   
 Other  Strength   
Environment Beneficial Products & Services  Hazardous Waste 
(env)  Pollution Prevention  Regulatory Problems 
 Recycling  Ozone  Depleting  Chemicals 
  Clean Energy  Substantial Emissions 
 Transparency/Communications  (added  '96, moved '05)  Agricultural Chemicals 
  Property, Plant, and Equipment (ended '95)  Climate Change (added '99) 
  Other Strength  Other Concern 
 
Table continued on next page. 
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Table 1: Continued 
 
Category Strength  Items  Concern  Items 
Human Rights  Positive Operations in South Africa (added '94, ended '95)  South Africa (ended '94) 
(hum)  Indigenous Peoples Relations (added '02)  Northern Ireland (ended '94) 
  Labor Rights (added '02)  Burma (added '95) 
  Other Strength  Mexico (added '95, ended '02) 
    International Labor (added '98) 
    Indigenous Peoples Relations (added '00) 
   Other  Concern 
Product Quality  Quality  Product Safety 
and Safety  R&D/Innovation  Marketing/Contracting Controversy 
(pro)  Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged  Antitrust 
  Other Strength  Other Concern 
Controversial   Alcohol 
Business Issues    Gambling 
(cbi)   Tobacco 
   Firearms 
   Military 
   Nuclear 
Notes: All items are listed in their corresponding category. Unless otherwise indicated, the item has been included in the 
data from 1991-2005. Items that were add to the data or discontinued (i.e., ended) in intermediate years are indicated, as 












Table 2: Summary of companies included in the KLD dataset 
 
Index 1991-2000  2001  2002  2003-2005 
S&P 500  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Domini 400 Social Index  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Russell 1000 Index  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Large Cap Social Index  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Russell 2000 Index  --  --  --  Yes 
Broad Market Social Index  --  --  --  Yes 
Approximate total number of    















Table 3: Pooled OLS, between, and fixed-effects estimates of specification (1) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled  OLS  Between  Fixed-effects 
CSIt-1  0.190*** 0.152*** 0.102*** 
  (0.030) (0.019) (0.024) 
ROAt-1  0.056 -0.012  0.005 
  (0.065) (0.072) (0.044) 
Debt  -0.398*** -0.264***  0.003 
  (0.102) (0.057) (0.119) 
lnAssets  0.180*** 0.149*** 0.144** 
  (0.026) (0.014) (0.071) 
lnSales  -0.023 -0.061***  -0.216** 
  (0.024) (0.016) (0.085) 
lnEmply  0.102*** 0.031  0.098 
  (0.031) (0.019) (0.083) 
      
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  11,041 11,041 11,041 
#  companies  2,914 2,914 2,914 
R-squared  0.19 0.16 0.34 
Notes: The dependent variable is CSRt. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors 
in columns (1) and (3) are clustered on companies. One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 









Table 4: Industry specific fixed-effects estimates of  in specification (1) 
 
SIC codes  Companies  Category  Coef.  Std. Err.  R
2 Obs.
 
1000 – 1799  136  Mining & Construction  0.026  (0.048)  0.24  529 
2000 – 2399  97  Food, Textiles, Apparel  -0.095  (0.077)  0.41  487 
2400 – 2799  99  Paper & Publishing  0.106  (0.089)  0.38  617 
2800 – 2899  224  Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals 0.153*  (0.079) 0.51  887 
2900 – 3199  45  Refining, Rubber, Plastic  -0.040  (0.106)  0.37  225 
3200 – 3569  161  Heavy Manufacturing  0.114**  (0.055)  0.38  788 
3570 – 3699  434  Computers & Precision Products  0.109*  (0.060)  0.38  1,568 
3700 – 3799  57  Auto & Aerospace 0.177**  (0.071) 0.58  302 
4000 – 4789  61  Transportation Services  0.007  (0.122)  0.47  253 
4800 – 4991  211  Telephone & Utilities  0.102*  (0.061)  0.32  988 
5000 – 5999  274  Wholesale & Retail  0.090*  (0.049)  0.37  1,150 
6000 – 6799  657  Bank & Financial Services  0.127***  (0.047)  0.44  1,937 
7000 – 7999  351  Hotel & Entertainment  0.176*  (0.090)  0.39  1,035 
8000 – 8999  117  Hospital Management  0.263**  (0.123)  0.36  275 
Notes: The dependent variable is CSRt. The reported coefficient is for CSI. Other variables in specification one are 
included, although not reported. All standard errors clustered on companies. One, two, or three asterisks indicate 




Table 5:  Pooled OLS, between, and fixed-effects estimates of specification (2) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled  OLS  Between  Fixed-effects 
CSIcgovi,t-1  0.160*** 0.135*** 0.076*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) 
CSIcomi,t-1 0.043**  0.053***  0.034** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) 
CSIdivi,t-1 -0.075***  -0.106***  0.003 
  (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) 
CSIempi,t-1 0.018  0.014  -0.003 
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) 
CSIenvi,t-1 0.068**  0.060***  0.045* 
  (0.031) (0.019) (0.024) 
CSIhumi,t-1 0.078***  0.110***  -0.003 
  (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) 
CSIproi,t-1 0.111***  0.132***  0.030 
  (0.029) (0.020) (0.019) 
CSIcbii,t-1 -0.026  -0.008  0.017 
  (0.023) (0.015) (0.029) 
ROAt-1  0.068 0.007 0.012 
  (0.061) (0.070) (0.046) 
Debt  -0.340*** -0.209*** -0.002 
  (0.098) (0.056) (0.114) 
lnAssets  0.154*** 0.121*** 0.135* 
  (0.025) (0.014) (0.070) 
lnSales  -0.038* -0.071***  -0.223** 
  (0.023) (0.016) (0.087) 
lnEmply  0.096*** 0.018  0.110 
  (0.031) (0.019) (0.082) 
      
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  11,041 11,041 11,041 
# companies   2,914  2,914  2,914 
R-squared  0.22 0.21 0.35 
Notes: The dependent variable is CSRt. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors 
in columns (1) and (3) are clustered on companies. One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical 






















CSIcgovi,t-1 0.002  0.051***  0.063***  0.044***  0.042**  0.005  0.030** 
 (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.014) 
CSIcomi,t-1 -0.010  0.054**  0.022  0.035*  -0.013  0.067**  0.013 
 (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.031)  (0.018) 
CSIdivi,t-1 0.010  0.008  -0.006  0.009  -0.002  -0.003  0.016 
 (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
CSIempi,t-1 0.007 -0.004  0.011  -0.032**  -0.003  0.010  0.021 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.016) 
CSIenvi,t-1 0.059***  -0.027 -0.021  0.126***  0.122***  -0.009  -0.028 
 (0.021)  (0.032)  (0.022)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.028)  (0.030) 
CSIhumi,t-1 0.007 0.020  -0.004  -0.026  0.000  0.078**  -0.024 
 (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.037)  (0.016) 
CSIproi,t-1  0.001  0.041 0.049**  -0.010 -0.002  0.004 0.012 
 (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.037)  (0.042)  (0.030) 
CSIcbii,t-1 -0.019  -0.017  0.025  0.021  0.034  -0.048  -0.062** 
 (0.026)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.042)  (0.038)  (0.028) 
ROAt-1  -0.109 -0.023 0.020  0.069  -0.027 0.003  0.057 
  (0.075) (0.038) (0.047)  (0.057)  (0.040)  (0.034)  (0.061) 
Debt  -0.256** 0.048  0.101 -0.192 0.130  -0.141  -0.225 
  (0.107) (0.120) (0.112)  (0.153)  (0.161)  (0.120)  (0.146) 
lnAssets  0.073 0.055  0.121*  0.153**  -0.062  -0.055  0.042 
  (0.059) (0.078) (0.070)  (0.066)  (0.088)  (0.064)  (0.078) 
lnSales  -0.056 -0.160**  -0.216***  -0.069 -0.055 -0.097  -0.099* 
  (0.042) (0.076) (0.082)  (0.060)  (0.090)  (0.066)  (0.051) 
lnEmply  -0.106 0.354***  0.161* -0.089 -0.132  0.185 -0.007 
 (0.075)  (0.101)  (0.088)  (0.089)  (0.109)  (0.164)  (0.089) 
              
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 11,041  11,041  11,041 11,041  11,041  11,041  11041 
# companies  2,914  2,914  2,914  2,914  2,914  2,914  2,914 
R-squared 0.02 0.13 0.25  0.16  0.13 0.01  0.10 
Notes: The dependent variable is CSRt for the specific KLD issue area indicated in the column. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are all clustered on companies. One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical significance 
at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 